TURNER ET AL. vs. WITHERS ET AL.
RECENT AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.
JAMES TURNER AND OTHERS VS. CHARLOTTE WITHERS AND OTHERS:
AND CHARLOTTE WITHERS AND OTHERS VS. JAMES TURNER AND
OTHERS.
The testator devised to his son and four daughters, by name, all his real
estate, during life, in equal shares; and if either should die without issue the
share of such child to be equally divided amongst the testator's remaining
children, for life; and upon the death of any child, who shall leave any child or
children, or the descendants of any such child or children, "the part of my
lands which any child so dying shall be entitled to for his or her life, shall
belong to, and I do hereby devise the same unto the child, or children, of my
child so dying, or their descendants," in equal shares, "and to their heirs for
ever, per stirpes and not per capita. And in case of the death of all my children
without issue" then over in fee. All the children survived the testator.
The son died without issue, leaving all the daughters. One daughter then
died, leaving children. Then one of the daughters died without issue: It was
held that her share, both the original portion and* that which accrued by the
death of her brother, descended exclusively to the surviving two daughters for
life, and then either to their issue, or the survivor of them, as the case might
be, in fee, and that the ultimate devise over failed, all the children not having
died without issue.

The opinion of the Court was delivered by
J.-James Calder, late of Baltimore county, died in

BARTOL,

clerk of the old court, and Mr. Blair having closed his office, refused, under
their order, to surrender the records, or permit access to them. The House of
Representatives, which by this time favored the old court, declared that it was
its duty to regain possession of its records. But as Blair's office was guarded
by men and guns, this could not be effected. Another appeal to the people (this
being the only issue) was necessary. Meanwhile passion was high, justice
prostrate, and judicial anarchy supreme. Appeals were taken to both courts,
and causes accumulated without being decided. Each party had its organs and
its champions. But in 1826 both houses were in favor of the old court, and thl
re-organizing act was repealed, and the old court (which had regularly held its
sessions, but transacted little or no business) restored to the undisputed exercise
of its jurisdiction.
Like the Missouri case, this was one of those contests which could not be
judicially determined. Whenever, says Mr. MADisoN, there is a contest between
the departments of the government, the peopZe alone can settle it, and their decision
must be final and imperative.
From the action of Governor FLETCHER an appeal to the people is open to the
removed judges, and the ultimate decision of the people, whether for the Governor or against him, will be very apt to be right.
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the year 1808, leaving a last will and testament, executed on the
14th day of May 1807.
This will was duly attested so as to pass real estate. Those
parts of the will, upon the construction of which the decision of
these appeals depends, are as follows:,,I give and bequeath unto my wife, Margaret Calder, the one
sixth part of the rents and profits of all my lands during her life,
in six equal parts to be divided, and the one equal sixth part of
all my personal estate, after my debts and funeral expenses are
paid, according to an agreement made between us previous to
marriage.
, I give and devise to my son, George, and to my four daughters,
Margaret, Mary, Sarah, and Charlotte, all my lands, tenements,
hereditaments, and real estate whatever and wheresoever, during
the term of their natural lives, to be equally divided between
them without impeachment of waste, and with full power to grant
leases, reserving a reasonable rent of all or any part of the said
lands for any term not.exceeding the term of seven years, subject,
nevertheless, to the above devise of one sixth part of the rents
and profits of my said lands to my wife during her life. I also
give to my said son, George, and to each of my said daughters,
the one equal sixth part of my personal estate, share and share
alike with my wife.
4,I further will and devise that if my said son, or either of my
daughters, shall die without leaving any children or descendants
alive at his or her decease, the part or parts of my lands and
estate devised to such child or children so dying, shall be equally
divided between my remaining children during the term of their
natural lives, without impeachment of waste, and with like power
to lease the same as above provided.
" I also will and direct that at the death of any of my said
children, who shall leave any child or children alive at his or her
decease, or any .deacendant of such child or children, the part of
my lands which my child so dying shall be entitled to for his or
her life shall belong to; and I do hereby devise the same unto
the child or children of my child so dying, or to their descendants as the case may be; if more than one, to be equally divided
between them, and to their heirs for ever per 8tnire, and not per
capita. In casa of the death of all my children without issue, I
give and devise all my estate to my friend John Gwynn and to
his heirs for ever."
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The widow and five children of the testator survived him. The
widow renounced her rights under the will, and died long since.
George, the son, died in 1809, without any children, never having
been married.
In 1811, the four daughters made a division between them, by
metes and bounds, of all the real estate of the testator, iucluding
the interest of George.
Mary, one of the daughters, having married Little, whom
she survived, died in 1852, leaving children and descendants
of deceased children, among whom the part allotted to her
in the division was divided by proceedings in the Circuit
Court for Baltimore county. No question arises upon those proceedings, and it is unnecessary to refer to them further, except
to say that, by the original division, two tracts of land, consisting of about one thousand one hundred and seventy-four acres,
near Parkton, in Baltimore county, became the property of Margaret Park, one of the daughters, in severalty for her life, and
after her death, to be held in severalty by those entitled in
remainder under the will of James Calder.
Margaret Park survived her husband, and died on the first day
of July 1860, leaving no children or descendants.
The questions in this case are upon the proper division of the
real estate held by Margaret under the will.
The only children of James Calder now living are Sarah
Turner, one of the complainants, and Charlotte Withers, one of
the respondents, both of whom have children living, who are
parties to this suit. The children and descendants of Mary Little
are also parties.
The complainants and Charlotte Withers and her representatives contend that, by a proper construction of the will of James
Calder, the land acquired thereunder by Margaret Park, that is,
the one fifth of his estate devised to her for life, and her one fourth
of George's share which on his death survived to her, passed on her
death to her two surviving sisters, Sarah Turner and Charlotte
Withers, in undivided moieties for their several lives, and after
their several deaths, will pass to their children or descendants
who may be living at the time of their several deaths, in fee, the
children or descendants of each to have the undivided moiety
of their mother per stirpes and not per capita.

The judge of the Circuit Court adopted this construction of
'the will, and decreed accordingly as to the original share or one-
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fifth part devised to Margaret by the will; but deciding that a
share, having once survived, would not survive again; decreed
that the part of Margaret's estate which had accrued to her by
the death of George (being one-fifth thereof) should be divided
between the heirs at law of James Calder to whom it had descended.
From this decree all parties have appealed.
The cause has been argued with much ability and learning; and
a great number of cases have been cited and relied upon in support of the various points and theories presented by the counsel
in argument.
Without attempting a particular examination of the various
theories and rules of construction suggested by counsel, or entering upon an analysis of the cases cited in their support, we think
the true construction of the will can be more easily and satisfactorily determined by a careful examination of the terms of the
will itself, keeping in view the well-settled rules of law governing
the questions before us, and aided in their application by reference
to a few adjudged cases.
The question in dispute is whether the children and descendants of Mary Little, deceased, are entitled to a share of the land
of Margaret Park, devised under the will of James Calder, and
that question involies: first, the inquiry as to that part of Margaret Park's land originally devised to her for life; and, secondly,
as to that part which accrued to her by the death of her brother
George.
First, as to the original share:By the plain words of the will, the estate of Margaret Park
was for her life only, and the limitation over after her death is a
contingent remainder. This is clear upon all the authorities. It
is a general rule in the construction of wills, "that a limitation,
which may operate as a contingent remainder, shall not be construed an executory ,devise :" Hoxton vs. Archer, 3 G. & J. 211.

The remainder is limited with a double aspect: if she leave
any child or descendants alive at the time of her death, then to
them in fee; if she leave none (which is the contingency that has
actually happened), then the devise is to the remaining children
of the testator for life. Who are the remaining children of the
testator? Only Sarah Turner and Charlotte Withers. They,
therefore, take by the plain terms of the will as tenants for life.
The counsel for the heirs of Mrs. Little have contended that
the words "remaining children" are to be construed, not as mean-
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ing surviving children, but as other children, meaning all the
other children of the testator named in the will; and many cases
have been cited to .show that the courts, in order to carry out the
intention of a testator, have construed the word "surviving" as
synonymous with other. It is unnecessary to refer to those cases,
or to discuss the principles upon which they rest. They seem to
us to be inapplicable here, and afford no aid in the construction
of this will.
The testator gives the remainder upon the death of Margaret to
his remaining children for life. The parties taking the remainder,
take by purchase as devisees under the will, and must answer the
description of the parties named as devisees; and it is clear that
no one can take except a caild of the testator. The children of
Mary Little do not answer this description, and cannot claim, as
devisees. See Nelson vs. Aubrey, Yes. 465; Winterton vs. Crawford, 1 Rus. & M. 407 (4 Cond. Eng. Chan. Rep. 489); Cover
vs. .Burgess, 81 Eng. L. & E. R. 529; Northway vs. Reed, 3
De G. N. & G. (17 Eng. L. & E. 150); Leeming vs. Sharratt,2
Rare (24 Eng. Ch. R. 14). Many other cases might be cited.
From these authorities it is clear that the children of Mary
cannot take as devisees under this clause of the will; nor can they
claim by descent from Mary, for the estate in remainder is given
for life only. As we have said, the interest devised on the death
of Margaret is a contingent remainder, and must vest, if at all,
on the death of Margaret.
To adopt the construction contended for, and to suppose that
the testator intended to include the children who were dead under
the denomination of remaining children, would have the effect
of vesting in Mary a life estate after her own death, which cannot
be: Luddington vs. Kime, 1 Ld. Raym. 203. We are of opinion.
that, by the words "remaining children," the testator intended
those children who might remain alive at the death of the first
devisee for life, surviving children. This is the natural and ordinary meaning of the words, and we find nothing in the will to
warrant any other interpretation.
By the subsequent clause of the will, the children of Mary
take nothing except the part which their mother was entitled to
for life; but Mary was not entitled to any part of Margaret's
share, she not having survived her.
Besides, the estate limited by the will to the children and descendants of Mary is a contingent remainder in fee, which must
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vest eo instante on the death of Mary, or never. They cannot,
therefore, take under this clause any part of Margaret's lands:
1 Preston on Estates 74, 75, 76, 88, 92, 119, 121, 122; 1 Ld.
Raymond 203; Miller vs. 0hapman, 31 Eng. L. & E. 836; Yesting vs. Allen, 12 Meeson & W. 299.
It follows, from-what has been said, that, by the true construction of those provisions of the will to which we have referred, the
share devised to Margaret would devolve at her death upon the
twa remaining children of the testator, Sarah Turner and Charlotte Withers, for life, to the exclusion of the children and
descendants of Mary Little. In this respect the intent of the
testator is expressed in clear and unambiguous terms. It is possible, that if he had foreseen the event which has happened, he
might have so framed his will as to give to the children of Mary
a share in these lands; but he has not done so, and the court cannot
do violence to the -express language of the will, to supply any
supposed wish of the testator; to do so, would be to make a will
for the testator.
Nor do we think the construction of these provisions of the
will is in any respect altered by the last clause, which limits the
whole estate to John Gwynn in fee, in case of the death of all
the children without issue.
This clause, it is argued, manifests a general intent of the testator in favor of all his children and descendants of his children,
which controls the particular intent expressed in the previous parts
of the will, and, in order to carry out that general intent, crossremainders in tail between the children will be implied.
This construction is based upon the assumption.that the limitation over to Gwynn is after an indefinite failure of issue.
Without meaning to express the opinion that the devise aver
to Gwynn, even if it were so construed, would raise such a necessary implication as to enlarge or defeat the estates before expressly
limited, a majority of the court are of opinion that the words of
this limitation, when read, as they must be, with the context, are
to be understood in their limited and restricted sense, and import
a failure of issue at the time of the death of the devisees for life;
they mean when all the children die without issue, as expressed in
the other part of the will. The devise over is not too remote, and
it is defeated when any of the children have died leaving issue.
On this question, we concur with the views expressed by the judge
of the Circuit Court. The rules. of construction in cases like

TURNER ET AL. vs. WITHERS ET AL.

this are very well expressed in Lewis on the Law of Perpetuity,
52 Law Library 183, 184. We refer also to Blackburn vs. -Edgeily, 1 P. W. 600; Baker vs. Tucker, 2 Eng. L. & Eq.; Ease
-vs. Terryford, 31 Eng. L. & Eq. 84; Goodright vs. Dunham, 1
Doug. 264.
Upon this construction of the devise over to Gwynn no question of implication arises. The law being well settled that, upon
such a devise over, no estate tail can ever be implied: 1 Jarman
490.
Second. We proceed to the consideration of the question as to the
share or part which accrued to Margaret by the death of George:
On this question we dissent from the views expressed by the
judge of the Circuit Court.
The general rule is well established that, "cwhere there are no
particular and sufficient words used for that purpose, surviving
shares will not survive again, and particularly in relation to real
estate :" iozon vs. Archer, 3 G. & J. 213; 2 Jarman on Wills
620.
Yet we think the case does not fall within the general =le.
In our opinion, there is upon the face of this will a clear intention expressed that the survived shares, as well as the original
share of a child dying without children or descendants, shall pass
to the surviving children.
There seems to be little question that, under the devise to
children and descendants of the tenant for life, all estate of the
mother will pass, as well her accrued share as her original share,
because the gift in that event is of the part which the child so
dying shall be entitled to for his or her life. And so the judge
of the Circuit Court construed that clause.
By the same reasoning, we think the preceding clause of the
will carries to the survivors, on the happening of the contingency
there named, as well the accrued as the original shares. The
language is quite as comprehensive, it gives to the ",remaining
children the part or parts of my lands and estate devised to such
child or children so dying." All the land held by Margaret Park
at the time of her death had been devised to her by the will, as
well her one fourth part of the share given to George as the part
originally given to herself, and therefore, by the express language
of the will, passes to the surviving sisters, Sarah and Charlotte,
for life. This construction is supported by authority. See Wilson
vs. Audrey, 5 Yes. 465; _E-yre vs. Marsden, 4 My. & Or. 231,
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(Eng. Ch. Rep. 18); Leeming vs. Sharratt, 2 Hare 14; Vandergucht v. Blake, 2 Yes., Jr. 534; Goodman vs. Goodman, 1 De
Gex & S. 699; Chamberlainevs. Uhamberlaine, 6 Ellis & B1. (88
Eng. C. L. 624); In re Crawball's Trusts, 39 Eng. L. & E. 449.
The decree from which these appeals were taken will be reversed,
and the cause iemande a to the Circuit Court, in order that a decree may be passed by that court in conformity with this opinion.
Considering that there was reasonable ground for contest with
reference to the true construction of the will, this court will not
award costs upon the appeals to the successful parties.
In our opinion, the costs of these appeals ought to be paid out
of the estate, and the Circuit Court will so direct by their decree.
Decree reversed, and cause remanded.
We have examined the foregoing case,
with more care, and compared it with
the decided cases, more minutely, than
it is always in our power to do. Our
first impression was that it was not of
thelclass of cases where the word
-survivor" has ever been held equivalent to "other," so as to include the
descendants of deceased children among
those entitled to share in the portion
allotted to children who should die
without issue. But in order to satisfy"
ourselves fully, we have reviewed the
English cases upon the point carefully;
and although there is not an entire
agreement among them, the result seems
to be, that where it is evident, from the
general character of the provisions of
the i7vill, that the testator did intend to
include the descendants of successors
under the term "survivors," and that
this construction is indispensable, in
order to carry out the main provisions
of the will, such construction will be
adopted, by holding "survivors" equivalent to "others."
I. The terms of the final devise over
to J. G., taken in connection with the
provision for the children of the testator, make it very evident that, either
there is not a full disposition of the
estate, or else the word "remaining"

must be construed as synonymous with
"other," so as to include the descendants of a deceased child among those
entitled to share in the share of any
child who should die without issue.
The final gift over is made, in terms,
to depend upon all the testator's children dying without issue. We cannot
construe this "all" as equivalent to
"any," since there'Is a specific provision for such a case. Nor can we, except from necessity, hold this final gift
over as equivalent to a provision, upon
condition of the indefinite failure of the
issue of all the testator's children, since
that would render itvoid for remoteness.
And the courts will never adopt a construction which will render a gift over
void for any cause, unless the terms of
the gift are so specific as to render
such construction inevitable ; Turner
s. Frampton, 2 Coll. 31..
If we hold the final gift over will only
take effect in the event of all the children dying without issue, when any one
of the children shall die, leaving issue, the final gift over is defeated,
and the share of that child, whether
it be a primary or secondary share,
will, by the terms of the will, go to
the issue of such deceased' child.
But if we suppose the first child to
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die leaving issue, and then all the
others to die without issue, by giving
the term "survivor" its strict construction, all the remaining shares,
after the termination of the life estate
expressly secured to the first donees,
will remain undisposed of. This is
obviously a result not intended by the
testator. And unless there is something in the terms of the will clearly
indicating that he did use the word
"remaining" as indicating those of his
childrenwhich shouldsurvive at the time
of the decease of any one of the number, it would seem that the remaining
shares are to go to the children of the
child first dying. The rule to this extent seems to be settled by the English
decisions beyond all question.
In Barlow vs. Salter, 17 Vesey 479,
Sir WILLIAx GRANT, M. R., seems to
assume it as the settled rule of construction of wills, that in all cases
"survivors" will have the force of
"others," whenever that will best conform to the general sense of the instrument, making all its provisions operative and reasonable. And Mr. Jarman,
although not entirely acquiescing in
the result, affirms that "survivor" and
"other" have, in such cases, been
treated as convertible terms, not only in
the case just cited, but "on more than
one occasion," by "eminent judges,"
2 Jarman, edition of 1861, 648. And
even where the language of the will is
too specific to allow of "survivor" being construed as equivalent to "other,"
there are numerous cases in the books
where such construction would more
nearly have carried out the purposes
and intention of the testator, than the
strict construction to which the courts
have felt compelled to adhere, on account of the specific language used.
Thus in Ferguson vs. Dunbar, 3 Br. C.
C. 469 and note, Lord TuoRow said,
that although it was one of those cases

in which he had the misfortune to see,
that it was the probable intention of
the testator to have the share of the
person dying without issue go to the
other children and to their respective
heirs, in case of the decease of any,
this could not be carried into effect
without too great a departure from the
language of the will. For although
the testator meant, by the use of the
term "survivors," to include the children of deceased children, yet "not
having said so, but having limited such
share to the survivors or survivor," he
must so declare. And a similar construction was adopted by Sir R. PEPER
AiDE, M. R., in Milsom vs. Awdry,
6 Vesey 465. And Lord ELnON, in
Davidson vs. Dallas, 14 *Vesey, 576,
treated this construction as a forced
and unnatural one, and said it was one
adopted by the courts, with a view to
admit after-born children with those in
existence at the death of the testator,
in cases where the provision was for
the children of other persons than the
testator; and many late chancellors
have quoted this language of Lord
ELDON, with approbation, as by Lord
LYNDHURST, in Crowder vs. Stone, 8
Russ. 217, where his Lordship said,
"it is a construction which the courts
may sometimes be compelled to adopt
in order to accomplish the intention
-which appears upon the whole will ;" and
Lord HARnWICKE, in Paine vs. Benson,
8 Atk. 78, is said (Ex parte West, 1 Br.
C. C. 576, s. a. 1 Cox, P. Wins. 275), to
have disapproved, and to have sought to
escape from this rule of construction by
finding a distinction, which other judges
could not adopt (Lord TnuRnow, in Ex
parte West, supra) ; but notwithstanding
this rule of construction has thus encountered the most stringent condemnation ; it seems nevertheless steadily to
have maintained its ground in the Engish courts, and may now be regarded as
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fully established, in all cases, where it
is indispensable, in order to carry out
the evident purpose of the testator,
and there is no -specific use of language
clearly indicating a contrary purpose.
The cases where the rule has been
'acted upon are too numerous to be here
referred to. In Wilmot vs. Wilmot, 8
Vesey 10, the word "surviving" was
held equivalent to "other," or "living
at the age aforesaid." And the same
rule is adopted in Doe d. Watts vs.
Wainewright, 5 T. Rep. 427. But Mr.
Jarman, vol. 2, p. 651, claims that the
tendency of the more recent cases is in
the opposite direction. Such also is
the intimation by Lord Baouanoi.i,
Chancellor, in Ranelagh vs. Ranelagh,
2 My. & K. 441. And the literal construction of the word 'survivor" is
adhered to in Cromick vs. Lamb, 8 Y.
&C. 565.
We might continue this analysis of
the cases much further, but that will
not aid our general purpose, which is
to give, as nearly as practicable, the
present state of the law in regard to
-the question. If anything further is
required, in that particular, we would
add:
That the rule of construing the word
"survivor" as equivalent to "other"
is not exactly confined to those cases
where it is evident the testator intended
to include all the primary donees and
their issue, among the secondary donees
,f a share failing for'want of issue in
the primary donee: For if that were the
extent of the rule, we should scarcely
expect much conflict in the cases. But
the rule, has more commonly been applied to cases where the testator hid
.overlooked the fact, that at the moment
when any of the primary shares failed,
the remaining primary donees might
not all be in life, some having before
-deceased, either with or without issue.
So that this rulE of construction is
often applied to meet contingencies not

anticipated by the testator. And in
such cases it will naturally be more
difficult to give the rule its proper apphcation, consistently with other wellestablished canons of construction, as
"that every word shall be allowed to
have its just weight and operation."
For it is not presumable that the testator would have used any form of language indicating a purpose counter to
a particular category of facts which he
really had in mind and intended to provide for. In such a case the language
may be defective, but it could scarcely
be expected to run counter to the real
intent of the testator. But on the contrary, if the difficulty arises from the
happening of a contingency not anticipated by the testator, it would not be
wonderful if the will might contain
forms of language not easily conformable to the new state of facts, to which
it had become desirable to make the
application, and still the case may be
one to which the rule ought to apply.
It has seemed to us that the case
before us was .probably one of that
character. From what we have before
aaid, it will be obvious, that unless the
terms "remaining children" can be
made to embrace the issue of any deceased child, the provisions of the will
may become incurably defective as to
effecting a thorough disposition of the
testator's estate. It might have happened that in this very case all the
shares except one should fail vf being
ultimately.dispcsed of. This will show
very conclusively, that if the testator
had b3een aware ot these contingencies
he would have provided for the shares
of those dying without issue. vesting
in the renisining ehildren and the issue
of any deceased child, in equal parts.
The courts seem to adopt this view.
And that is precisely the contingency
in which "survivor" has been read
"other."
And still it seems to us the court
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have really taken the correct view of
the case, in following the strict construction of the terms used. For there
is something more, in the present case,
than the simple use of the term "remaining children," which unquestionably
indicates, with considerable certainty,
that the testator must have had his
own children, and not the issue of any
deceased child, in his mind. The whole
scope of the will shows that the testator intended his children to have
only a life estate in his lands, and to
give the fee to their children. The
fact then that he provides for a life
estate only in those who should take the
share of any child dying without issue,
raises a very strong presumption that

he expected it to go, in the first instance, to that class for whom he was
providing life estates. This, with the
use of the words "remaining children,"
and the fact, that when he does provide
for the children of any deceased child,
his language is very minute and technical; all this will present., as it seems
to us, a much stronger case for adhering to the strict construction of the
terms used, than is found in most of
the more recent English cases. We
regard the case as a valuable one; and
it seems to us the opinion is drawn up
with unusual fairness and clearness.
We understand- that the Chief Justice
did not concur in the opinion upon the
I. F. R.
main point.

Supreme Court of Blinois.
WILLIAM LYNCH V8. THE PEOPLE OF ILLINOIS.
Under a constitution which provides, that "all persons shall be bailable by
sufficient sureties, unless for capital offences, where the proof is evident, or the
presumption great," it seen evidence will be admitted on motion in term-time,
or on habeas corpus, at any time, before trial, to ascertain whether the offence
charged on the indictment may be of such a grade as to entitle the prisoner
to bail.

This was an indictment for murder, found upon the following
facts:In the month of September 1864, William Lynch went to the
post-office of the town of Ashkum, Illinois, and asked Mr. Stringham, the postmaster, for letters. Some dispute took place, and
eventually a serious quarrel, in which Lynch struck Stringham
with a knife, inflicting a wound which ultimately resulted in death.
Lynch was arrested and. indicted before the grand jury for wilful
murder. A true bill was found, and he was remanded to jail to
await his trial. His counsel filed an application for a continuance,
and also moved that he be admitted to bail, and that the court hear
evidence against him with a view to determine whether the offence
was a bailable one or not. It was alleged on his behalf, that the

-
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grand jury should have indicted him for the lesser crime of manslaughter; that he had acted only in self-defence, and to save his
own life; that he would be able to prove that he was attacked
and beaten upon various parts of his head and body, with a large
undressed wagon-spoke, until he became delirious and raving; that
in that condition the fatal blow was given; and that it was done
without malice, &c. The court granted the motion for continuance,
but overruled the others.
Counsel for the prisoner excepted to the ruling, and sued out
a writ of error; hence the present proceeding.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
BREESE, J.-We are obliged to dismiss this writ of error for
the reason that the refusal of the court below to hear evidence
upon the application of bail is not such a final judgment as may
be brought here for review. But we desire to say that the Circuit Court might well have heard the evidence, and inquired into
the grade of the alleged offence, with the view of allowing or refusing bail, as might have appeared proper upon the facts. The
mere fact that the grand jury has found an indictment for murder does not preclude an inquiry into the facts of the case, to
ascertain whether the offence may be of such grade as to entitle
the prisoner to bail.
Should an innocent man be indicted for murder, as is sometimes
done, it would be a gross injustice to ask him to lie in jail, perhaps for months, until a trial could be had, and without any
opportunity of asking an investigation of the case, with the view
of obtaining bail. We know that a party may, under an indictment for murder, be convicted of manslaughter, and, doubtless,
grand juries are often controlled by that consideration in refusing, as is generally the case, to find indictments for the lesser
offence.
It would be very unjust, when the law declares that if'the
offence be of a lower grade than murder, it shall be bailable, iliat
the ac6used shall be -concluded upon that question, intil final trial,
upon the mere finding- of the grand jury, ,ivhich is necessarily
based, to a great extent, fo reasons of public policy, upon a mere
ez parte examination.

We think an inquiry into the facts should always be made, upon
the application of the pris6nbr, for the purpose indicated in this
motion.
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The application may be made upon motion, as in this case in
term-time; or, by habeas corpus in term-time or vacation.The above opinion is given as a step
in the argument, still pending in the
American courts, upon the important
question indicated therein. Beyond
referring to Hurd on Habeas Corpus,
pp. 436-444, where the cases on both
sides are collected and well discussed,
we desire only to say, that the constitutional provision evidently contemplates the admission of all offenders to
bail, except in a certain class of capital
cases. The object of construction is
to determine, first, in precisely what
cases bail may, and in what it may not
be allowed; and, secondly, by whom
the grade of the offence on which the
question of bailability depends, is to
be determined. The constitution itself
fixes the rule by which bailable are
to be distinguished from non-bailable
cases; "all persons shall be bailable,
by sufficient sureties, unless for capital
offences where the proof is evident or
the presumption great;" which means,
that bail shall not be allowed in such
cases where there is direct proof of
guilt that is convincing, or where the
indirect proof from presumption, based

upon circumstantial evidence, is reasonably conclusive. The main difficulty arises upon the second point.
If, as is commonly the case, the arrest
be made upon indictment found by a
grand jury, either that body or the
court which impanneled it, must pass
upon the question of bailability. It is
easy to say that a grand jury is not a
proper tribunal to exercise so important a trust. It commonly acts, and
must do so, upon im yarte evidence.
When the law has recognised several
grades of the same general offence, as
of homicide, and made the highest not
bailable, whilst the lower.are bailable,
nice questions of law must often arise
upon which a grand jury ought not tc
be allowed to pass, and which yet are
the only questions of difficulty in the
case. In such a state of the facts, to
refuse to listen to evidence tending to
show that the offence was of a lower
grade than that found by the grand
jury, and so bailable, would be practically to nullify the constitutional
J. A. J.
guaranty.

County Court, Cook County, Illinois.
VAUGHAN VS. VAUGHAN.
The witness to a will may sign out of the presence of the testator, and afterwards acknowledge his signature in presence of the testator.

On the 26th day of October, the deceased requested his pastor,
Asahel L. Brooks, to draw his will for him, and gave said Brooks
directions how to draw the same, who went home, and in his study,
and out of the presence of the testator, drew the instrument, and
there signed his name to the same as a witness.
On the day following, said Brooks took said instrument to the
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deceased, who was then sick in bed, and then read the whole will
to him, together with the usual. attestation clause, and the name
of said Brooks infull, as signed thereto. The deceased expressed
himself as satisfied therewith, and the witness Guilford then signed
the same in the presence of the deceased, at his request. Said.
instrument was admitted to probate without any contest or notice
to the heirs at law, and on the day following, James Vaughan, a
brother and heir at law of the deceased, moved tlie court to set
aside the probate, on the ground that the witness Brooks was not
an attesting witness within the meaning of our statute.
B. G. Oaufield, for eontestant.-Brooks is not an attesting
witness in the language of the statute; and at the time he signed
at his house out of the presence of the deceased, and the day
before the will was executed, he was not an attesting witness,
and no subsequent approval of the testator could change the
character of that signature.
The witness must attest in presence of the testator : 1 Mallory 31, 32,Watson vs. Pipe, 32 Miss. (8 George) 451.
Where the witnesses sign in the presence of the testator, and
before he signs, and he then takes the will and signs it, this is
good, because all done at the same time - Vaughan vs. Buford, 3
Brad. 78.
If the several acts required by the statute are performed at the
same time, and at periods of the same transaction, the order of.
them is immaterial: Doe vs. .Doe, 2 Barb. 200; 2 Barb. p88;.
Kenney vs. Whitmarh, 16 Barb, 141 ; 8 Brad. 86 ; Id. 353;.
Lyons vs. Smith, 11 Barb. 124.
Attestation is the act of witnessing an instrument of writing,
at the request of the party making the same, and subscribing the
same as a witness: 3 Camp. 28; 2 Smith R. 449; 2 Starkie
on Ev. 332; 12 Wheaton 91;. 1 Yes., jr. 12; 2 South R. 449; 1
Phillips on Ev.410; 2"Dee 96; 2 Eng. Eccl. 60, 214, 289, 367.
If there were any doubt about the la.wof this. case, it is removed by Baqland vs. Huntington, I Iredell, 565 ,a case almost
identical with the one now before, the court.
Mather and Taft, contrL-The case- of Cooper vs. ,Bbceaq
7 Eng. Eccl.. R. 537, *ould bear against thew due executi6m- of
Vaughan's willj were it.,not for the material difference betweew
the English statute and! the Illinois statute,.and tler final judgment of the.court in favor of the *l
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The words of the English statute are: "cSuch witnesses shall
attest and shall subscribe the will in the presence of the testator-"
Again. Our statute states, after requiring attestation, what
the witness must swear to, and in the requisition does not require
them to say that they signed or subscribed in the presence of the
testator, which is a legislative construction dispensing with that
feature, so often inserted in statutes, on the ground of cexpressio
unius est exclusio alterius."
As to what is a sufficient signing, vide Adams vs. Field,6 Washburn 265; Knights vs. Crawford, 1 Esp. N. P. 190; 1 Jarman on
Wills 70 ; 2 Greenleaf on Ev. 49, note 1; Swift vs. Wiley, 1 B.
Monroe 117.
It is a sufficient and a valid attestation, if the witness, when
requested to attest the will, adopts the signature already on the
instrument without subscribing it again: 2 Grattan 430; 6 Wash.
(21 vol. 1) 270; -Ellis vs. Smith, 1 Ves. Sen. 11 ; Caqrleton vs.
Griffen, 1 Burr. 549 ; Sarah Miles' Will, 1 Dana 1; Hale vs.
Hall, 17 Pick. 873 ; Jones vs. Lake, 2 Atk. 177; Atontgomery vs.
Perkins, 3 Metcalf (Ky.) 449.
JAmES B. BRADWELL, Probate Judge.-Under the English
statute, which requires that the witnesses shall attest and subscribe the will in the presence of the testator, it has been held
that a will must be subscribed by a testator before it is subscribed by the witness: Cooper vs. Bockett, 7 Eng. Eccl. R.
535; In the Goods of James Byrd, deceased, Id. 391; In the
Goods of G. L. Oldney deceased, Id. 841. These cases, from
the very loose manner in which they are decided, and as no
authorities are cited, are not entitled to any great weight in determining the question now before the court, and more particularly as the English statute, by its express terms, requires that
the witnesses must attest and subscribe their names in the presence
of the testator, which language would seem to be much stronger
than the language used in our statute. Even under a statute
like the English, the Supreme Court of Kentucky have decided
that the order of time in which the testator and witnesses sign
their names is not material, and that the testator may sign after
the witnesses: Smith and Wife vs. Wiley, 1 B. Monroe 114.
The same court say, in commenting upon this statute: "To
attest the publication of a paper as a last will, and to subscribe
to that paper the names of the witnesses, are very different things,
VoL. XIII.-47
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and are required for obviously distinct and different ends. Attestation is the act of the senses, subscription is the act of the
hand; the one is mental, the other mechanical, and to attest a
will is to know that it was published as such, and to certify the
facts required to constitute an actual and legal publication; but
to subscribe a paper published as a will is only to write on the
same paper the names of the witnesses, for the sole purpose of
identification. There may be a perfect attestation, in fact, without subscription ; but to insure identity, and prevent the fraudulent substitution of any other document than that which had been
published and attested, the statute providently requires the attesting
witnesses to subscribe their names in the presence of the testator."
I do not consider the case of Ragland vs. Huntingdon, 1 Iredell's Law R. 565, cited with so much confidence by the counsel
for the contestant, as authority in point, as I find upon examination that the statute upon which that case was decided required
the will to , be subscribed in the presence of the testator by two
witnesses at least."
The case cited from Gilman was under the statute of 1818,
which was like the English statute.
In the application of the word attested to the act of the witnesses, it must have been the intention of the legislature that the
attention of the witnesses should be called to the condition of
the imind of the testator at the time of signing or acknowledging
the will, and the testator must not only sign or acknowledge it to
be his will, but he must do it with the intention of making it his
will. Consequently, the mental power or capacity of willing is
necessary, as well as the corporal power of putting the name, to
constitute a signing. It is the duty, then, of the persons required
by the statute to be present at the execution of a will, not only
to attest the corporal act of signing, but to try, judge, and determine whether the testator is of sound mind and memory at the
time of signing.
Powell, in his Treatise on Devises, says, page 71: ";But the
liberal construction which the -courts put upon the word, signing'
necessarily raises a question 'upon the import of the word 'attesting,' as applied to the instrument, viz., whether the witnesses were
to attest the very act andfactum of signing, or whether an ac.
knowledgment by the testator that the act was done by him, and
that it was his handwriting, was not sufficient to enable the witness to attest, for it was contended that this word should receive
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a construction agreeable to the law and rules of evidence in other
cases, and that as an attestation upon an acknowledgment was
good in every other case, so in this an attestation on the acknowledgment of the testator that it was his handwriting, should be
an attestation of the act of signing. And this, indeed, is a necessary conclusion, from the decision in the case of Lemayne vs.
Stanley, Id. 72."
Under statutes providing that the testator shall "sign" his
will in the presence of the attesting witnesses, ;ny amount of
authorities may be found that a simple acknowledgment by the
testator that it is his signature to the instrument is sufficient.
In the case of Sturdivant et al., vs. Birchett, 10 Grattan 67,
"cA will is executed by the testator, and certain persons are requested to attest it. -For convenience they took it into another
room, out of the vision of the testator, and there subscribe their
names to the paper as witnesses, and they immediately, within
one or two minutes, return to the testator with the paper, and
one of them, with the paper open in his hand, addresses the testator, and says, ' Here is your will witnessed,' at the same time
pointing to the names of the witnesses, which are on the same,
and close to the name of the testator. The testator then takes
the paper and looks at it, as if examining it, and folds it up, and
speaks of it as his will, and the court held that under all the
circumstances of the case the recognition of their attestation by
the witnesses to the testator was a substantial subscribing of their
names as witnesses in the presence of the testator, and that, too,
under a statute similar to the English statute." Vide 1Pollock vs.
Gra8sell, 2 Gratt. 439; Rosmer &' Co. vs. Franklin, 6 Gratt. 25.
It has been held in many American cases that the fact of the
testator signing the will after the witnesses made no material
difference, where it was one entire transaction: -Ros8er &- Co. vs.
-Franklin,6 Grattan 26.
Under our statute, a person may sign. his name to a will even
in the presence of tle testator, and not be an attesting witness.
It is not the act of signing his name and seeing the testator sign
his name or acknowledge his signature to the will that makes him
an attesting-witness; something more is required. The witnesses
must become such by the request of the testator, and the testator
must in some way be conscious of the attestation of the witness.
Perhaps it may not be too much to say that the witness writes
his name on the will as evidence of the attestation required by
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the statute, and for the purpose of identification, that the attesta-.
tion would be incomplete unless the witness wrote his name, there
can be no doubt.
The principal question in this case is, Can the itnesses to a
will signed out of the presence of the testator afterwards adopt
their signature in the presence of the testator? and upon this
question it must be confessed that the authorities do not agree.
We .have seen that in numerous cases in Virginia, in Kentucky,
and Vermont, it has been held that they can, and in South Carolina and one or two other states that they cannot.
Judge Redfield, in his very able work on Wills, page 247, note
6, says, that the law as laid down in 10 Grattan 67, above cited,
is the only sensible view which can be taken of the subject; and
in speaking of the decision, 3 Gratt. 439, upon the same point,
says: -This seems to us altogether more reasonable than some
of the nice refinements of the English courts upon this point:"
Redfield on Wills, page 230, note 8.
I am of the opinion that under our statute the witnesses to a
will may, in the presence of the testator and at his request, adopt
their signature previously made out of the presence of the testator, and that from the time the witness Brooks received the instructions of the deceased until the will'was executed- the next
day, it was one incompleted transaction; that what was said by
the deceased to the witness Brooks at the time deceased signed
the will, taken in connection with the action of said Brooks in
reading aloud the will of the deceased, the attestation clause and
the name of said Brooks as a witness thereto to the deceased,
amounted to an adopting of the signature of said Brooks, made
to the same in his study on the previous day, and operated as a
.present attestation to said will by said -witness. It
is very evident that the testator intended said Brooks should be a witness
to his will; that he had every confidence in him; that the'testator at the time he signed his name knew that Brooks had already
signed his name as a witness to the will, tind was then there in
that capacity attesting the execution of the instrument by the
testator, and scrutinizing his conduct so as to be able to testify at
the proper time that all the requirements of -the statute had been
complied with.
I think that in %hiscase the statute has been substantially complied with, and that to pronounce against this instrument would
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be giving it a construction altogether too strict against testamentary right.
We have ventured to publish the foregoing opinion, although that of an inferior court, on account of its great
research and innate good sense; and
also because the subject is, of late,
attracting considerable attention in the
American states, in bonsequence of the
inexplicable distinction which the English courts persist in maintaining between the signature of the testator and
that of the witnessesto a will, admitting
that in the former cases the adopting
of a signature, made at any other time,
is of the same force and validity as one
made at the time of attestation; but
insisting that this rule will not extend
to the case of witnesses to the will, but
that it is indispensable they should
make their signatures at the time of
attestation.
This is a degree of refinement which
is not only unreasonable and unjust,
but, as it seems to us, wholly incomprehensible, even to the profession. It
is a distinction for which, to our apprehension, no substantial or appreciable
reason ever has, or ever cai be, assigned, and which is liable to induce great
injustice. We must say, that with the
American sense of propriety, and of
always acting up to the fitness of things,
we do not believe it would ever have
,occurred to any judge, or counsellor, in
this broad empire, where ingenuity and
narrow escapes are proverbial, that it
would be possible to maintain any such
distinction between the mode of attestation, by the testator and the witnesses.
We are not aware that any American
court has yet indorsed the English doctrine, to the full extent; unless a late
case in Vermont, decided by a divided
court, and not yet reported, may be so
considered; while there are numerous
cases in this country which have adopt-

ed the natural and rational view: that
there can be no essential practical difference between making and adopting
a signature, by the witnesses, which
will not apply, with the same force, to
the testator.
When it is so apparent, from a careful
examination of the English cases, that
the strange discrepancy between the rule
applied to the testator and the witnesses
was one not adopted, of preconceived
purpose, but was purely accidental, from
following precedents, without precisely
seeing, at first, that they were going to
lead to any such incongruity, we do
feel solicitous that the American courts,
who are not embarrassed by any authoritative precedents upon the point,
should so shape their course, as to escape the incongruity of a distinction
without a difference; that they should
either recede from the rule hitherto
adopted and acted upon, with reference
to the testator, or else that they should
adhere to the same rule, in regard to
the attestation by the witnesses, unless
it can be made to appear that there is
a substantial difference in the two cases,
either as to the requirements of the
several provisions of the statute applicable to each, or else in the nature of
the two cases.
We trust it will not be demanded of
us, by the profession, who have hitherto
been so indulgent towards us, that we
should offer any apology for publishing
an opinion, which alludbs, in so moderate terms, to our own humble judgment in the matter; but we do desire
to say, in regard to the quotation from
our book on the Law of Wills, that what
we there said does not adequately express our present sense of the desirableness of having the American law upon
the point so adjusted, that there shall
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not continue this inexplicable difference
in the form of attestation required from
the witnesses to a will, and that allowed
to the testator. We feel no hesitation
in believing, that the conclusion towards
which we have urged the American
courts will be adopted by the English
House of Lords, whenever the question
shall come before that court of last resort for final adjudication. And it will

be but poor evidence of the self-reliance
of our own courts, to find them then,
for the first time, adopting a rule of
construction, in regard to the unanswerable propriety of which there could
never have been entertained more than
one opinion, by sound minds, when considered with regard to natural fitness
and propriety, and aside from the authority of precedent.
I. F. R.

Superior Court of Bew York City.
WILLIAM T. WILKINS vs. WILLIAM P. EARLE et at.'

Where a guest at an inn, in compliance with a general notice from the innkeeper, delivered to the clerk to be deposited in the safe, a sealed package, and
in reply to au inquiry as to what it contained merely said ,money," the innkeeper, on the loss of the package, was held liable only for an amount equal to
reasonable travelling expenses.
General principles of the liability of innkeepers discussed.

Barney, Butler

.

Parsons,and :E. Pierrepont, for plaintiff.

John McMJeon, F. Sm y t h, and V. F. Allen, for defendants.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
ROBERTSON, C. J.-The liability of keepers of inns for property,
which travellers, who are guests therein, bring with them, is as
old as the existence of inns in England : Hollingshed's Chronicle,
cited in Edwards on Bailment, App. 620. The whole doctrine in
relation thereto is summarily stated in the recital of an ancient
original writ, entered in the Register of Writs, f. 105, among
writs of trespass (on the case), and set out at length in Fitzherbert's Natura Brevium 94 a, b. Such writ forms the groundwork of the early decision in Ualye's case, 8 Rep. 32, in which
the general principles embraced in such doctrine are evolved from
such writ; All of which have some bearing on this-case, and are
in substance as follows:1. The place of loss is required to be an inn (commune hospitium), which is defined to be' c a house where the traveller is fur'

We are indebted for this case to the courtesy of John McKeon, Esq.-
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nished with everything he has occasion for on the way :" Thompson vs. Lay, 3 B. & A. 288; the keeper of it not being bound
to furnish any thing else: Fell vs. Knight, 8 M. & W. 276; such
as a place of sale for goods: Burgess vs. Clement, 4 M. & S. 306;
or to receive any one but travellers: Rex vs. Luellin, 12 Mod.
445; or anything but what is usually brought with or carried by
them: Broadwood vs. aranava,10 Exch. 417; s. c. 24 Law J.
Exch. 1. Although he is liable to an action in not receiving
them: Com. Dig. Action on the Case; Rex vs. Jones, 7 C. & P.
218 Bacon's Abr. Inns Court, c. 3; Thompson vs. Lay, 3 B. &
A. 283; as well apparently as indictment: Year Book, 5 Edw.
IV., Easter Term, fol. 10, by HOGDON, J.; 1 C. & K. 404; Edw.
on Bailm. 408; he cannot make any terms or conditions with his
guests: 6 T. R. 17, per Lord KENYON; Cole vs. Godwin, 19
Wend. 269, per COWEN, J. A house becomes an inn by the mere
custom of receiving persons transiently as guests, without a definite agreement as to time: Wintermoute vs. Clarke, 5 Sandf. 242;
Taylor vs. .fonnot, 4 Duer 116. But a mere restaurant or place
of eating is not one; Carpentervs. Taylor, 1 Hilt. 193.
2. The guest must be a traveller: 1 Roll. Abr. 394; 2 Brome
254 ; Rex vs. Luellin, 12 Mod. 445 ; Ingolsbee vs. Wood, 86 Barb.
451; Bacon's Abr. Inns C. 5; .Parkhurstvs. Foster, Salk. 883;
the time of his stopping is, however, immaterial, whether it be
of some duration or for mere refreshment: Barnell vs. Mellor, 5
T. R. 278: Carpenter vs. Taylor, 1 Hilt. 198; McDonald vs.
-Egerton, 5 Barb. 56.
3. The loss or injury for which the innkeeper is liable is that
of or to goods and chattels (bona et catalla) placed within the
inclosure and shelter of the inn and its appurtenances (infra hospitium), as laid down in the Year Books, 11 Hen. I-V. 45 a. b. ;
22 Hen. VI. 21 b. ; 42 Eliz. 3, 11 a. b. ; 42 Ap. pl. 1. Although
animals put out to pasture. at the guest's request are not *so: 1
Roll. Abr. 84; 4 Len. 6; 2 Browne 255; Hawley vs. Smith, 25
Wend. 262 ; yet vehicles left in the street by the innkeeper's servant: Jones vs. Tyler, Ad. & El. 522; or a wagon-load of goods
in like manner placed in an uninclosed shed: rPipervs. Manny, 24 Wend. 282 ; or a sleigh-load of grain in an outhouse where
such. articles were usually stored: Clute vs. Wiggins, 14 J. R.
175 ; and goods placed in a "ccommercial" room: Richmond vs.
Smith, 8 B. & C. 9, were held to be so.
4. The person by whom the articles were taken, or the mode
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of loss, is immaterial: Year Book, 22 Hen. VI. 38, pl. 8; Roll.
Abr. tit. Rostler 7 ; Olute vs. Wiggins, ubi sup. ; Giles vs. Libby,
36 Barb. 70 ; 2 Kent's Com. 593; Story's Com. 306, §§ 470,
479; Bell's Corn. 402-3 (4th ed.), 496 (5th ed.); Edwards on
Bailm. 400, 403, 407; Jones on Bailm. 94; unless such person
were the servant or companion-of the guest: Cro. Eliz. 285;
Burgess vs. Clements, ubi sup.; Fowler vs. Dorlan, 24 Barb.
384 ; or the negligence of the guest contributed to the loss : 10
Eliz., Dyer 266 ; Burgess vs. Clements, ut ante; Farnsworth vs.
Parkwood, 1 Stark. 249.
5. For clothing, ornaments of the person, including a reasonable amount of jewelry, generally worn by travellers, which embraces a gold watch and chain, gold pen and pencil-case: Giles vs.
Libby, ubi sup.; and for sufficient money to pay the travelling and
other reasonable daily expenses of the guest, the innkeeper is
held liable: Taylor vs. Monnot and Giles vs. Libby, ubi sup. ;
Van Wyck vs. .Howard, 12 How. Pr. 197; Stanton vs. Leland,
4 E. D. Smith 88.
Beyond that, unless the innkeeper has voluntarily and knowingly undertaken the custody or care of property, no case has
adjudged his liability; some elementary writers and some dicta
make him liable for everything a traveller chooses to bring into
an inn. Judge STORY, in his Commentaries, states the liability
in general terms (p. 806, § 470) ; Chancellor KENT in his extends
it to "all the movable goods, chattels, and moneys of the guest
which are within the inn" (2d vol., 593). In Calye's case (ubi
sup.) it is said to embrace even documents relating to the title
of lands and choses in action; in Kent vs. Shuckard, B. & Ad.
803, the only question raised was, whether the innkeeper was
liable for money as well as other chattels, and it was held that
he was; the amount lost in that case was only fifty pounds, and
stated to have been kept to meet daily expenses only. In
Quintin vs. Courtney, Hay (N. C.) 41, the amount was only two
hundred dollars, and the case of Fowler vs. BDorlon, in our own
Court, 24'Barb. 384, is in direct conflict with the principle held
in that case. In the Berkshire Woollen Company vs. Proctor,
7 Cush. 417, although the mondy lost was more than sufficient
to defray the expenses of the particular guest in whose charge
it was, it was the property of another person, and left with such
guest to pay to others who were guests at the same inn, or defray
their expenses there; they being witnesses in a lawsuit, whose
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management was the errand of stich guest at such inn, and all
such circumstances are dwelt upon in the opinion delivered in
that case. Nothing was said, except in general terms, in Purvis
vs. Coleman, 21 N. Y. 111, about the liability of an innkeeper,
who had not given any notice to his guests of means provided
for the safe keeping of their property. In that case he was held
to be exempt from liability for a loss, in consequence of the
failure of the guest to avail himself of such means after notice.
In the case of Giles vs. Libby (ubi sup.), it was held that ornaments or money usually carried about the person by a prudent
man did not come within the provisions of the statute of 1855
(ch. 421), exempting innkeepers from liability for goods of a
guest not deposited in a place of safe keeping provided by them,
after notice of such provision, as the money lost ($25) was held
not to be more than a prudent person might carry about with
him.
Being thus at sea in regard to direct decisions as to the extent
of an innkeeper's liability for the goods of his guest, we can only
have recourse to indirect recognitions of the true doctrine in
decided cases, to analogies to the liability of other persons and
principles drawn from the origin and nature of the legal relation
of the innkeeper and his guests.
It has always been conceded that, upon all the goods for whose
safe keeping he is liable, an innkeeper has a lien for the keeping
of his guest (Grinnell vs. Cook, 3 Hill 485; Ingoldsbee vs. Wood,
ubi sup.), even when they are not the property of his guest:
_obinson vs. Walter, Bulstr. R. 269; s. c. Poph. 127. But in
the case of Brodwood vs. Granava, 10 Exch. 417, s. c., 1 Jurist
N. S. 19, 2 L. J. Exch. 1, it was held that an innkeeper was
not bound to receive a piano with a guest, and therefore had no
lien upon it. Counsel in that case said, in argument, that he
was cc only compellable to take in such articles as both in naiure
and quality are reasonable for a traveller," to which PARKE, B.,
assented, and added : " He is bound to take in those things with
which a person ordinarily travels, * * * to receive all goods
which by his public profession he engages to receive ;" but put
the pertinent interrogatory, " Is he bound to take in articles of
extraordinary bulk ?" to which I would add, "or value ?" the
principle being precisely the same.
The origin of the liability of an innkeeper to his guest for the
loss of the latter's property while in his inn, %the principle of
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policy applicable to it, and indeed the whole relation, are so
analogous to those applicable to a common carrier and a passenger
transported by him, in relation to what is called his " baggage,"
that the extent and conditions of their liability have been held
to be the same: Orange County Bank vs. Brown, 9 Wend. R.
85; Jones on Bailment 103; Edwards on Bailment 414. The
definite term baggage, it is true, has been applied only to the
property of the passenger carried about with him for travelling
purposes, for which the carrier is liable; and probably if the
same term had been applied in legal phraseology to the goods of
a guest at an inn, for whose safe keeping an innkeeper was liable,
the question of liability would have been long since settled. The
same obligation is imposed upon both, upon account of the public
character of their occupation of receiving travellers, by the carrier as passengers and by the innkeeper as guests, which involves
also the necessity of receiving their travelling equipments, although
the carrier escapes liability, if they are not delivered directly

into his custody: Tower vs. Utica and Schenectady B. R. Co.,
7 Hill 47; Cohen vs. Frost, 2 Duer 335. Generally neither
receives separate compensation for care in regard to such baggage (Powell vs. Meyers, 20 Wend. 591), except when a carrier
receives compensation for it as freight. The same danger in
both cases of fraud or carelessness on the part of the innkeeper
and carrier, or their servants, and the impossibility of the constant attention of the owner of the goods to their safe keeping,
is the ground of liability. Although the carrier has been held
to be exempt from liability for money destined to meet travelling
expenses (Orange 'County Bank vs. Brown, 9 Wend. 85), yet this
rule does not prevail when travelling abroad (Duffy vs. fhompson, 4 R. D. Smith), in which case even a gun carried in a trunk
and the tools of a trade have been included (Davis vs. Cayuga
6 Susquehanna B. B. Co., 10 How. 830), articles usually worn
about the person, such as a watch and articles of jewelry, are
included in such liability, if in a trunk: McCormack vs. Hudson
B. R. Co., 4 E. D. Smith 81. And although it is laid down in
general terms that everything destined for the personal use, convenience, and even instruction and amusement of a passenger is
included in the baggage for whose safe transportation a carrier
is liable (Hawkins vs. Hoffman, 6 Hill 586), yet the extent of
his liability is very much narrowed; it does not embrace merchandise (Pardes vs. Drew, 15 Wend. 457), or samples of it
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(Hawkins vs. Hoffman, ubi sup.), -or boxes of jewelry for sale
(Richards vs. Westcott, 2 Bosw. 587), or silver ware (Bell vs.
Drew, 4 E. D. Smith 59), or presents for friends (Ib.), or regalia
or jewels of a society (Nevins vs. Bay &tate Steamboat Company,
4 Bosw. 225); and it is fully settled that the mere acceptance of
a trunk or baggage, containing what is not for personal use, does
not bind the carrier, without knowledge of its contents: Bichards vs. Westcott, ubi sup. Of course, different rules prevail in
.regard to a common carrier of mere freight (Batson vs. Donovan,
4 B. & A. 21; Mills vs. Cattle, 6 Bing. 743), where goods of all
kinds and of any amount of value are received and a distinct
compensation is paid for carrying them. Deceit practised in
regard to goods carried as baggage relieves the carrier, from liability, which it would not, if carried as freight: Richards vs.
Westcott, ubi sup. The presumption in regard to articles brought
by travellers to an inn, as well as to the' depot of a carrier for
transportation, when contained in trunks or packages and of
unknown value, must be that they consist merely of the ordinary
accompaniments of a traveller Then travelling, and not articles
or securities for commercial or other purposes ; if they are more,
both the innkeeper and the carrier are at least entitled to notice
of their value and character beyond that extent.
Previous to the introduction of the law allowing parties to be
witnesses for themselves, travellers, in case of a loss at in inn,
of their personal effects, were allowed to testify to the contents
of their trunks: Taylor vs. Monnot, ubi sup.; and this was placed
on the ground of the necessity of the case, counterbalancing the
consideration of any danger arising therefrom by the fact that
the loser couV only recover to the extent of the value of what
usually is carried by travellers. But the evil arising from such
admission of testimony, which would be slight when confined
within such limit, would become gigantic if a traveller could
testify to the loss of articles of indefinite value, as to which there
would be no power of contradiction.
It is possible that the liability of an innkeeper may be divided
into two elements, as well as that of a carrier: Dorr vs. N. .
Steam Navigation Company, 4 Sandf. 136; and that he may
und er that which -makes him liable as a bailee be so liable for
goods received by him into his inn; when, either from their
appearance or actual notice, he knows they are not the usual
accompaniments of a traveller as such and assents to their reception, but still such notice would be requisite.
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It is very plain that it would be highly unjust, and not founded
upon any principle upon which an innkeeper's liability rests, for
a traveller to be able to bring into an inn unobserved any amount
of valuables without notice to the innkeeper, and hold him responsible for their safe keeping. There must be some restriction or
qualification of such liability, if it exist; and that must be a warning to the innkeeper of the extra risk he is about to run. It is not
very material in such cases whether such notice is made a condition of such liability, or the want of it, is made such negligence
on the part of the traveller as to be assumed to have contributed
to the loss, and thereby exonerate the innkeeper: Pettigrew vs.
Barron, 12 Wend. 324; Giles vs. Fauntleroy, 13 Id. 216; Martin vs. Brown, 1 Cala. 225; Fowler vs. Dorlon, 24 Barb. 384.
In the case last cited (Fowler vs. Dorldn) it was held to be such
negligence, in the traveller who delivered his valise containing
money to a servant of the innkeeper, not to have informed him
of the fact, as to deprive him of the right of recovery for its loss.
In this case, therefore, unless a special contract was made by the
delivery by the plaintiff of the package of valuables in question
to the clerk of the defendants on the occasion proved, the question of notice will be essential. If no special contract was made,
and no notice given, the liability of the defendants would depend
upon precisely the same principles as if the package in question had
been taken from the plaintiff's room in the inn of the defendants.
If any special contract was entered into by the transaction
between the plaintiff and the clerk on the occasion in question
of the delivery of the package to the latter, it could only have
been by virtue of some authority given to the latter to make such
contract. The safe in which the plaintiff requested such package
to be deposited was one provided by the defen~ants, pursuant to
the provisions of the statute of 1855, already referred to, and
such clerk was not authorized to make any other contract except
that to be implied from the mere receipt and deposit of the package in such safe, exactly in the condition in which it was. No
authority was proved or found to have been given to him to agree
to become responsible for parcels of unknown value. The notice
posted in the hotel of the defendants required a package to be
deposited to be ,properly labelled," and the clerk informed the
plaintiff " that they made their guests describe the property before
re-delivery." It waq, therefore, only for packages properly labelled
the defendants undertook to be responsible, and it was only of such
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property as could be described their clerk undertook to take care.
If the defendants were not responsible for the contents of such
package before'it was deposited in such safe, while in their hotel,
I do not think the clerk who received it was authorized to make,
or did make on their behalf, a special contract for its safe keeping at all hazards, especially when without any compensation
commensurate with the risk.
This case, therefore, resolves itself into the question, whether
the plaintiff, by depositing in the safe of the defendants the package which he delivered to their clerk, under the circumstances
under which he so deposited it, and with no more notice of its
value than was given in his conversation with such clerk at the
time of such delivery, was not guilty of such negligence, or did
not so violate the implied condition of the liability of the defendants as to exempt them entirely therefrom. A notice, to be sufficient to relieve the plaintiff from the imputation of negligence,
should be not only of the kind of property, but its value. Otherwise, if the innkeeper was upon other principles not bound to
accept its custody, he could not fix his compensation for the voluntary risk assumed by him, and would not increase his vigilance
and precautions to prevent a loss. The package was sealed up,
and marked only with the plaintiff's name, which furnished no information. The plaintiff, upon being asked what it was, answered
merely "money," which is equally unsatisfactory and indefinite.
Besides, the defendants notified him that, if their safe was to be
used as a depository, packages deposited in it were tc" be "properly labelled," which, of course, involved a description of their
contents or a statement of their value. The mere information
that a package contained -money" without knowledge c the
amount would not necessarily arouse the increased vigilance of
the defendants. Indeed, the whole conduct of the plaintiff,
including his mode of carrying the property in question, the time
and place selected for changing the envelope, the sealing up with
no external mark but his name, his curt reply to the question
-What it was," indicate rather a reluctance to make known its
value. Such acts were deficient in candor to the defendants,
whose safe he chose to make the depository of his capital in business, instead of the vaults of a bank. True, he might have lost
such package, even if its contents had been disclosed, and yet
the defendants might have had their attention attracted to it if it
had been properly labelled. By not giving proper notice, the
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plaintiff must be presumed to have trusted to the safety of his
place of deposit and the honesty of the clerk, rather than the
responsibility of the defendants.
I am, therefore, of opinion the defendants are only liable for
the amount lost by the plaintiff equal to his travelling expenses,
as found by the jury; the general verdict, which is controlled by
such special finding, must be reduced to that sum, and the exceptions as to the amount beyond that sustained; the other exceptions,
being untenable, must be overruled and judgment rendered for
the amount so found.
GARVIN, J., concurred.

McCuNN, J., dissented.

Circuit Court of the United States for the Western Circuit of
Pennsylvania.
MAYOR, ETC., OF BALTIMORE VS. THE CONNELLSVILLE AND S. PENN.
RAILROAD COMPANY.
If in an act of incorporation, the legislature of a state retains the right to
revoke the grant of the charter, either absolutely, or whenever in its opinion
the company misuses its privileges, the latter or its members cannot complain
of the exercise of the power of revocation.
But where the right to revoke was only in case the corporation should misuse
or abuse its privileges, the fact of such misuse if denied by the corporation
should be established by competent proceedings.
An act declaring a revocation without the establishment of such%fact is
unconstitutional.

The charter of the Pittsburgh and Connellsville Railroad Company contains the following provision, viz.: " If the said company
shall at any time misuse or abuse any ot the privileges herein
granted, the legislature may resume all and singular the rights
and privileges hereby granted to suci corporation."
Under this clause the legislature, by an act passed in 1864,
revoked and resumed all and singular the rights and privileges
granted to said company, so far as the same authorized it to construct any line or lines of railway southwardly or eastwardly from
Connellsville.
The opinion of the court was delivered, July 18, 1865, by
this repealing act repugnant to the constitution
GRIER, J.-Is
of the United States, on the ground that it impairs the obligation of the contract between the state and the company ?
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The objections made on the argument to the form of the pleadings and the right of the complainant to have the remedy sought
-in his bill, will be found overruled in a similar case by the Supreme Court. We refer to the case of Dodge vs. Wolsey, 18 How.
386. In that case the complainant was a stockholder in the corporation, whose interests were likely to be injuriously affected by
the state legislation, if it should be carried into effect. In this
case the complainant is a creditor, who, on the faith of legislative
acts, granting certain franchises and privileges to the Pittsburgh
and Connellsville Railroad Company, has advanced large sums of
money, which have been expended in constructing their road. If
that corporation submit to this act of the legislature, divesting
them of a most valuable part of their franchises, the security and
rights of the complainant 'would be materially injured. The bill
is in the nature of a bill quia timet, and the complainant has a
right to the remedy sought, if the court should be of opinion that
the act of 1864 impairs the obligation of the original contract, or
act of incorporation granted to the Pittsburgh and Connellsville
Railroad Company.
The only question, then, is as to the validity of this act. That
the act repealing the franchises of the corporation, or a material
part, and transferring its franchises and property to another corporation without its consent, impairs the obligation of the original
contract, is not, and cannot be denied. Nor is it denied that an
act granting corporate privileges to a body of men who have proceeded on the faith of it to subscribe stock and borrow money,
and expend it in the construction of a Valuable public improvement, is a contract, and that it is not in the power of either party
to it to repudiate or annul it without the consent of the other.
The state claims no sovereign power to repudiate its contracts
or defraud its citizens, and the constitution delegates no such
power to the legislature.
If in the act of incorporation the legislature retains the absolute and unconditional power of revocation .for any or no reasons;
if it be so written in the bond, the party accepting a franchise on
such conditions cannot complain if it be arbitrarily revoked; or if
this contract be thst the legislature may repeal the act whenever
in its opinion the corporation has misused or abused its privileges,
then the contract constitutes the legislature the arbiter and judge
of the existetice of that fact.
. But the case before us comes within neither category. The
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contract does not give an unconditional right to the legislature to
repudiate its contract, nor is the legislature constituted the tribunal to adjudge the question of fact as to the misuse or abuse.'
Moreover, the case before us admits that the condition of facts
upon which the legislature are-authorized to repeal the act, does
not exist. It admits that the corporation has neither ,misused
or abused its privileges." A charter may be vacated by the
decree of a judicial tribunal in a proper proceeding for that purpose, without any such reservation in the act. Then both parties
are heard and a verdict of a jury on the facts can be obtained,
which concludes the question. But the legislature possesses no
judicial authority under the constitution, and has no established
course, of proceedings in the exercise of such power.
The party who is injured by its action is not heard. The reasons usually alleged in the preamble to such acts are the mere
suggestions of some interested party, seeking to speculate at the
expense of others-professional solicitors who infest the lobby are
ever ready, for a sufficient consideration, to impose on the good
nature of honest but often careless legislators, by the suggestion
of any necessary falsehood.
If any one should feel curious as to the methods used by agents
of corporations to obtain such legislative acts as may be desirable,
they will find them fully exposed in the opinion of the Supreme
Court delivered in the case of Marshallvs. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company, 16 How. 833.
We do not intend even to insinuate that any such secret service
by cc skilful and unscrupulous agents" ",stimulated to active partisanship by the strong lure of high profits" to use " most efficient
means" to get the vote ,of the careless mass of legislators," have
been used in this case. But we do say that the recitals in the
preamble to this act exhibit a labored attempt to justify a more
than doubtful exercise of power by an array of reasons which,
even if true in fact, might-be demurred to in law as insufficient.
The act does not contemplate the exercise of the right of domain
by which the property of individuals or corporations may be taken
for some public use on making ample compensation. Its object
is to transfer the franchises and property of one corporation,
anxious by every means in its power to'complete a valuable public improvement, to another whose interest is not to complete the
road, and who are not required to do so at any time in this or the
next century. Where in a case like the present the legislature
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are asked to take the property of one corporation and give it up
to another on the ground that one has abused or misused its privileges, the just and proper mode would be to pass a resolution
ordering the Attorney-General to institute the proper legal proceedings to ascertain -the fact of "misuse or abuse." If such
issue be found true then that the charter be revoked or resumed.
We do not say that without such judicial proceeding ascertaining
the existence of tde condition in which the right of repeal is
reserved, the act is absolutely void; but we do say that in all
such cases the party injured, if he denies the existence of such
"misuse or abuse," has a right to be heard, and'to have that
question tried before he shall surrender his property or his franchise. We do not think it necessary to notice the numerous and'
conflicting cases which have been brought to our notice by the
learned counsel.
In the case of Erie &N. East B. R. vs. Casey, 26 Pa. and 1:
Grant, the court found, after a full hearing of the paities, that
the fact of "misuse or abuse" did exist, and therefore the act
* was not void.
It cannot, therefore, be any precedent for a case which admits
that such facts do not exist. The principles of law, so far as
they affect this case, are very clearly and tersely stated by Chief
Justice LEwIs, in his opinion to be found in 1 Grant 275, with a
review of the cases and a proper appreciation of that from Iowa.
The sum of the whole matter is this:1. The complainant has shown a proper case for the interference of the court in his favor.
2. That the act complained of is unconstitutional and void
under the admissions of the case.
3. The complainant is entitled to the decree of the court on the
pleadings as they stand.
4. .That the defendants have leave to withdraw their demurrer
and answer over; and if they shall so request, an issue will be
ordered to try whether the Pittsburgh and Connellsville Railroad
have misued or abused their charter.
MoCANDLESS, District Judge, concurred.
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